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I. 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this certified question are the Plaintiffs/Appellants, Gayle Burns, 
and I.M.B, a minor (hereinafter "Burns" or "Appellants"), and the defendant Michael J. 
Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security (hereinafter "Agency"). 
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OPENING BRIEF 
( 
IV. < 
JURISDICTION 
Original jurisdiction upon this matter is vested in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
to Rule 41, Utah R.App.(a) and (c), Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
Rule 415 Utah R.App.P. (a). Authorization to answer questions of 
law. The Utah Supreme Court may answer a question of Utah law certified
 { 
to it by a court of the United States when requested to do so by such 
certifying court acting in accordance with the provisions of this rule if the 
state of the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding before the certifying 
court is uncertain. 
i 
Rule 41 Utah R.App.P.(c). Certification order. 
(c)(1) A certification order shall be directed to the Utah Supreme 
Court and shall state: 
(c)( 1 )(A) the question of law to be answered; 
(c)(1)(B) that the question certified is a controlling issue of 
law in a proceeding pending before the certifying court; and 
(c)(1)(C) that there appears to be no controlling Utah law. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The question certified to the Utah Supreme Court: 
Is a signed agreement to donate preserved sperm to the donor's wife in 
the event of his death sufficient to constitute 'consent5 in a record to 
being the 'parent' of a child conceived by artificial means after the 
donor's death under Utah intestacy law, Utah Code Ann. §786-15-707 
Traditional standards of review do not apply to certified questions from the Federal 
District Court to the Utah Supreme Court, if there is no decision to affirm or reverse a 
1 
lower court's decision. Egbert v. Nissan North America, Inc., J \ HI;' In I} 111 11 )> H„ S X :i 
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\ 1, 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
78B-15-102. Definitions 
(1) "Adjudicated father" means a man who has been adjudicated by 
a tribunal to be the father of a child. (Bold not in original) 
(3) "Assisted reproduction" means a method of causing pregnancy 
other than sexual intercourse. The term includes: 
(a) intraurterine insemination; 
(b) donation of eggs; 
(c) donation of embryos; 
(d) in vitro fertilization and transfer of ei ill )iy os;< md 
(e) intracytoplasmic sperm injection. 
(5) "Birth mother" means the biological mother of a child 
(6) "Child" means an individual of any age whose parentage may be 
determined under this chapter. 
(9) "Determination of parentage5' means the establishment of the 
parent-child relationship by the signing of a valid declaration of paternity 
under Part 3, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act, or adjudication by a 
tribunal. (Bold not in original) 
(18) "Parent-child relationship" means the legal relationship between 
a child and a parent of the child. The term includes the mother-child 
relationship and the father-child relationship. 
(22) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible 
medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable 
in perceivable form. 
(26) "Tribunal" means a court of law, administrative agency, or 
quasi-judicial entity authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support 
orders or to determine parentage. 
78B-15-104. Adjudication - Jurisdiction 
(2) The district court and the juvenile court have jurisdiction over 
proceedings under Parts 7 (Assisted Reproduction) and 8. 
2 
( 
786-15-201(2). The father-child relationship is established between 
a man and a child by (e) the man having consented to assisted reproduction 
by a woman under Part 7, Assisted Reproduction, which resulted in the 
birth of the child: 
78B-15-202. No discrimination based on marital status. A child 
born to parents who are not married to each other whose paternity has been 
determined under this chapter has the same rights under the law as a child 
born to parents who are married to each other. 
78B-15-703. Husband's paternity of child of assisted 
reproduction. If a husband provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted 
reproduction by his wife as provided in Section 78B-15-704, he is the father 
of the resulting child born to his wife. 
78B-15-704. Consent to assisted reproduction. (1) A consent to 
assisted reproduction by a married woman must be in a record signed by the 
woman and her husband. 
78B-15-707. Parental status of deceased spouse. If a spouse dies 
before placement of eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the deceased spouse is not a 
parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a 
record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased 
spouse would be a parent of the child. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Appellants brought this action to obtain surviving child's and mother's benefits 
through the Social Security Act upon the death of their father/husband, Michael Burns 
and his Social Security earnings record. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
In September, 2005, Appellant applied for two types of Social Security Survivor's 
3 
benefits - surviving child's insurance benefits on behalf of the minor child, I.M.B, and 
surviving mother's insurance benefits based upon the earnings records of Michael Bums, 
the deceased father/husband, (tr 50-55). The Agency denied the claims initially and 
upon reconsideration found that Appellants had not shown that I.M.B. was Mr. Bums' 
"dependent child" as defined in the Social Security Act. (tr 56-60, 64-66). A hearing 
was held on October 3, 2007 with Administrative Law Judge Donald R. Jensen presiding 
and issuing a decision on August 22, 2008 reversing the denial of benefits, and finding 
that based on the record evidence the Appellants were entitled to surviving child's and 
mother's benefits on Mr. Bums' earnings records, (tr 28-39). On February 6, 2009, the 
Agency's Appeals Council found "good cause to reopen the case pursuant to 20 CFR 
§404.988 and 404.989 due to legal errors in the ALJ's decision" (tr 17-25) and issued a 
decision on August 18, 2009 alleging errors in the ALJ's decision and concluded that the 
Appellants had not shown that I.M.B. was "the dependent child" of Mr. Bums as defined 
under the Social Security Act and that the Appellants were not entitled to surviving 
child's and mother's benefits on Mr. Bums' earnings record, (tr 4-16). Thereafter 
Appellants filed a Complaint in the United States District Court to be heard de novo on 
October 14, 2009 with a redacted amended copy filed on October 16, 2009 (not in 
transcript). The Agency filed a timely Answer to said Complaint (not in transcript). 
Thereafter the United States Federal District Court did certify the question to the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah R.App.P., 41(a), and the Utah Supreme Court issued an 
4 
i 
Order of Acceptance on August 5, 2010. 
VIII. < 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Michael Burns married Appellant Gayle Bums on August 24, 1997. (tr 68). 
2. In April 2000, Mr. Burns was told by his doctors that he had Non Hodgkins 
Lymphoma, and a tumor behind his sternum, and he would require chemotherapy and 
radiation therapy. He was told that he had a 95% chance of survival with chemotherapy 
and radiation treatments, which treatment would most likely leave Mr. Bums sterile, (tr 
231). 
3. Mr. Bums and his wife, Appellant Gayle M. Burns, signed a Semen Storage 
Agreement on May 30, 2000. Thereafter, Mr. Bums deposited samples of his semen for 
cryopreservation. (tr 69-72, 108-111). 
4. The Semen Storage Agreement, Section 1 stated: "The Donor has consulted 
with a doctor and it has been determined that the Donor may be an appropriate candidate 
to have his semen collected, evaluated, frozen and stored for his future use or other 
possible uses as hereinafter set forth. (Bold not in original.) Semen is desired by the 
donor for one more of the following reasons: 
A. Prior to vasectomy; 
5 
B. Prior to irradiation and/or chemotherapy;1 
C. Prior to exposure to potentially toxic medications; 
D. Prior to exposure to potentially toxic environmental conditions; 
E. Prior to travel or extended absence of the donor; 
F. Prior to artificial insemination; 
G. Prior to shipment of the semen to another location; 
H. Or other reasons deemed appropriate by my Doctor, (tr 69, 108). 
5. Mr. Bums also signed in the Semen Storage Agreement a statement: 
In the event of the death of the donor, the donor would like his vials 
of semen (initial 1 of the items below): 
(A) Destroyed 
(B) Maintained in storage for future donation to Gayle Burns (fill 
in name and relationship)2 will assume all obligations and 
terms described in this contract. MB [Mr. Bums' 
initials], (tr 70-71, 109-110). 
6. On March 24, 2001, Mr. Bums died of cancer-related complications in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, (tr 78). 
7. On May 3, 2003, Appellant had herself artificially inseminated with Mr. 
Burns'cryopreserved semen, (tr 113-14). 
Please note that no instructions were in the document to sign, circle, check or 
initial to any of these "reasons." Someone, most likely Mr. Bums, circled choice "B, 
Prior to irradiation and/or chemotherapy." 
2Filled in by Mr. Bums. 
6 
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8. Appellant gave birth to I.M.B. in Salt Lake County, Utah on December 23, 
2003 as a result of the artificial insemination, (tr 113). < 
9. Initially I.M.B. 's birth certificate did not reflect the name of his father, 
Michael Burns, (tr 117). However, a request by Appellant for an amended birth 
certificate (tr 116) reflecting Michael Burns as I.M.B.'s father was granted on September 
3, 2004 by the Utah Department of Health, Office of Vital Records and Statistics, (tr 79-
83, 118-20). 
10. The Social Security denials and approvals process then occurred as outlined 
in Appellants' Statement of the Case (B), "Course of Proceedings and Dispositions," 
brief, p. 3-4. 
11. Elizabeth Park, the deceased wage earner's sister, was appointed as a 
special administrator In the Matter of the Estate of Michael Burns (DOD 3/24/01), 
Case No. 083900243 in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake Division, Utah, (tr 
174-75). (Signed copies of formal probate documents not in transcript but in Appellants' 
Addendum.) 
12. Appellant filed a Petition for Determination of Paternity In the Matter of 
I.M.B. (DOB 12/23/03, a minor child, on November 9, 2007 in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah, Case No. 074904953 before the Honorable 
Anthony B. Quinn. (tr 104-121). 
13. A hearing was held on March 18, 2008, with testimony being taken from 
7 
Mrs. Burns and Elizabeth Park5 Special Administrator, and Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law and an Order submitted and signed by the court on April 15, 2008. 
(tr 167-75). 
14. In said Conclusions of Law it indicated that Petitioner had met their burden 
of proof and there was clear and convincing evidence that I.M.B. was the son of Michael 
A. Burns. Specifically in said Order, Judge Quinn stated, "That all rights arising from 
said parent/child relationship, including those of care, custody, support and 
inheritance are hereby granted for the benefit of I.M.B., a minor." (tr 168-9). (Bold 
not in original.) 
IX. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellants opine that the Semen Storage Agreement was sufficient under §78B-
15-704(1) and §78B-15-707 to show that Michael Burns "consented in a record" that if a 
child were to be born by assisted reproduction from his cryopreserved semen after his 
death, the child would be considered his child and eligible as his heir under Utah intestacy 
law, and thus eligible for surviving child Social Security benefits. 
X. 
RESPONSIVE ARGUMENT 
The Appellant and her husband, when they signed the Semen Storage Agreement, did not 
know the significant Utah or federal laws that would later play out in this case. The relevant 
8 
Utah statute is: 
< 
"If a spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the deceased { 
spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented 
in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased 
spouse would be a parent of the child." Utah Code Annotated 78B-15-707. 
The University of Utah School of Medicine, Division of Urology, submitted this Semen j 
Storage Agreement to Mr. and Mrs. Burns in May 2000. With Mr. Burns believing that he was 
successfully going to come back strong from irradiation and chemotherapy, he had to trust in the 
University of Utah School of Medicine that all of his bases were covered. 
In Section 1 of the Agreement, it states: 
Semen is desired by the donor for one more of the following reasons: 
A. Prior to vasectomy; 
B. Prior to irradiation and/or chemotherapy; 
C. Prior to exposure to potentially toxic medications; 
D. Prior to exposure to potentially toxic environmental conditions; 
E. Prior to travel or extended absence of the donor; 
F. Prior to artificial insemination; 
G. Prior to shipment of the semen to another location; 
H. Or other reasons deemed appropriate by my Doctor. (Bold not in original) 
Mr. Burns, by signing the Agreement, was requesting his cryopreserved semen be used 
for one of eight specific reasons. 
Mr. Burns did not have to circle B, "Prior to irradiation and/or chemotherapy." He was 
not instructed to circle any of the "following reasons" in the contract, yet he did so only knowing 
his present facts and his expected 95% chance of total recovery from his disease. 
The Burnses did rely upon paragraph 3(1), "In the event of the death of the donor, the 
9 
donor would like his vials of semen (B) Maintained in storage for future donation3,4 to Gayle 
Burns, who will assume all obligations and terms described in this contract."5 Thus, we must 
look at the "terms" in the contract that apply. Clearly, Mr. Burns, by his gifting the 
cryopreserved semen to his wife, understood that the cryopreserved semen would be saved "prior 
to artificial insemination" and could be used to "contribute to a future pregnancy" and create 
"offspring resulting from artificial insemination" and "achieve pregnancy with insemination" 
and "that may be able to result in a pregnancy." Thus, the Burnses had this signed document 
that indicated, by reasonable inference,6 that Gayle Burns could artificially inseminate herself 
even if her husband passed away. 
There was also a "reasonable expectation" by the couple that Gayle would later be able to 
use the vials of cryopreserved semen to achieve pregnancy, even if her husband died before 
artificial insemination and birth of the child. 
Unfortunately, most contracts dealing with the "reasonable expectation doctrine" 
generally involve automobile insurance policies. However, Wagner vs. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 786 P.2d 763, Ut.Ct.App 1990, does gives us some guidance to the "reasonable 
expectation doctrine" when reading the Semen Storage Agreement and extrinsic evidence that 
3Donation: A gift, esp. to a charity. Black's Law Dictionary 561 (9th ed. 2009) 
4Gift: The voluntary transfer of property to another without compensation. Black's 
Law Dictionary 757 (9th ed. 2009) 
5Mr. Burns did not initial the box to have the vials of cryopreserved semen 
"destroyed" upon his death. 
inference: A conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical 
consequence from them. Black's Law Dictionary 847 (9th ed. 2009) 
10 
bolsters their reasonable expectations. 
Three factors that a Utah court must look at in making a judicial determination of < 
reasonable expectations are "the following interrelated factors: First, whether the insurer 
[University of Utah] knew or should have known of the insureds' [the Bums'] expectations; 
1 
second, whether the insurer [University of Utah] created or helped create those expectations; and 
third, whether the insureds' [the Burns'] expectations are reasonable." Wagner at 7667,8. 
The first factor is met in that the Bumses discussed the "donation upon death" clause with , 
the hospital representative before signing the agreement. They went home that night and 
specifically discussed the clause about what would happen to the cryopreserved semen if Mr. 
Bums passed away prior to artificial insemination. Tr at 232-236 and full quote at pages 12-13 
of this brief. 
The second factor is that the University of Utah did draft this contract and submitted it to 
the Bumses. With all the references to pregnancy, offspring, artificial insemination and the 
clause wherein Appellant would receive by donation the vials of cryopreserved semen in the 
event of the death of Michael Burns, the Appellants' expectations of being able to use the 
Reasonable expectations include "what the weaker contracting party could 
legitimately expect by way of services according to the enterpriser's "calling," [sic] and to 
what extent the stronger party disappointed reasonable expectations based upon the 
typical life situation. Wagner quoting Gray vs. Zurich Insurance Company, 65 Cal.2d 
263, 54 Cal.Rptr. 104, 107, 419 P.2d 168, 171 (1966). 
8To accomplish this determination, we examine, in addition to the wording of the 
contract, "extrinsic matters such as the intent of the parties, the purpose sought to be 
accomplished, the subject matter of the contract, and the circumstances surrounding the 
issuance of the policy." Wagner at 768, citing Bonner County vs. Panhandle Rodeo 
Association. Inc.. 101 Idaho 772, 620 P.2d 1102. 1106, 1980. 
11 
cryopreserved semen at any time for artificial insemination were very reasonable. 
The very reasonable expectation of the Burnses were that Ms. Burns, with the "future 
donation" to her of her husband's cryopreserved semen, was that a child could be conceived 
posthumously by assisted reproduction, satisfying the third factor. 
This court must again look at the contract clause, "In the event of the death of the donor, 
the donor would like his vials of cryopreserved semen maintained in storage for future donation 
to Gayle Burns, who will assume all obligations and terms described in this contract." This court 
then must look for any relevant extrinsic evidence in determining whether that phrase and the 
contract is ambiguous regarding Mr. Burns' future intent, and should consider any credible, 
extrinsic evidence offered to show the parties' intentions (and their reasonable expectations). 
Nielson v. Gold's Gym. 78 P.3rd 600, 2003 UT 37, para 7. See also Gilmore v. Macv. 121 
P.3rd 57, 2005 Ut.App.351; Ward vs. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (UT 
1995). Tying together the reasonable expectations of the Burnses and the ambiguities in the 
contract results in only one interpretation: Mr. Burns intended his cryopreserved semen to be 
used to artificially inseminate his wife even after his death. 
There is clearly a "record" with one of the parties being the Social Security 
Administration in the original administrative proceeding before the U.S. Administrative Law 
Judge Donald R. Jensen. When questioning Ms. Burns under oath, Judge Jensen queried: 
Q (by Social Security ALJ Jensen) To the best of your 
recollection, at the time that this semen sample was taken, had you or he 
discussed the possibility that he would not survive the chemo and radiation, 
that he would die and whether or not he wanted to leave you with a child 
that he was not going to be able to support? 
A (by Ms. Burns) We hadn't discussed it until we actually signed 
12 
( 
this agreement where he had to notate what happened what happened [sic] 
if he did die, what he wanted. And before we signed the agreement we 
went home that night and had a discussion about if he did pass away he ( 
wanted the sperm to go to me so that a piece of him would be be - - a piece 
of him and I would be on the earth. He wanted me to have his kids. 
Q So you did not sign that immediately when they presented you 
with that option? 
A No, we didn't. 
Q Were you there with him when it was first presented to him, that 
question? 
A I was, yes. 
Q And the two of you wanted to go home and talk about it? 
A We did. Because of his survival rate, the 95 percent we hadn't 
really even considered him not surviving, so that's the matter of discussion 
that night. 
Q And he decided he wanted a piece of him - - see, there are two 
competing interests here, a piece of me going on or he's saddling you with a 
burden that I can't help you support, two competing interests going on here 
A Right. 
Q - - that needed to be resolved. And he resolved that to the best 
of your recollection here, and I knowr you're not a disinterested party here. 
A Right. 
Q To this conversation. To the best of your recollection he said 
that he wanted a piece of him to go on even if he should die before the child 
was conceived? 
A He did. He wanted a child of his on the earth. 
13 
Q The next day he signed that? 
A He did. The next day he went in to do the deposit. 
(tr 232-233). 
Q (By attorney Hadley) And Ian [sic] [Michael] signed this on May 
30, 2000 and he passed away on March 24, 2001. When did he actually get 
worse where he started discussing this? 
A (By Ms. Burns) He went through two rounds of chemo and we 
had to go through a bone marrow transplant and at that point his chances 
were 50/50 and we had to discuss more of what was going to happen if he 
passed away. 
Q When approximately was that? 
A That was, let's see, he went for bone marrow of 2000, December 
of 2000, toward the end. 
Q Did either of you think about going back and looking at this 
contract and making any changes on it that would indicate that the saved 
sperm would be being used for artificial insemination? 
A I don't think we thought about the agreement at that time 
because it was quite a trying time for us. I think what we as lay people had 
thought of as the agreement was that it would have taken care of it because 
we didn't see any reason not to think it would. 
Q So it was you and Michael's understanding that if he passed 
away the contract that you'd signed seven months before gave you the right 
to use that semen to impregnate yourself? 
A It was my understanding, yes, and Michael's. 
(tr236). 
Further, Elizabeth Park, the sister of the deceased and special administrator of his 
estate, testified that herself and Michael's three brothers recognize I.M.B. as their 
nephew, and all of their children recognize him as their cousin, and Grandma and 
14 
Grandpa Burns recognized I.M.B. as their grandchild, (tr 172 para. 14 and 173 para. 7). 
Further, Ms. Park states on the Social Security record that she discussed this with 
her brother Michael, stating: 
Q (By Attorney Hadley) Prior to your brother's death, did you ever 
happen to have any conversations with him about this semen storage he had 
with his wife? 
A (Ms. Park) Yes, I did. 
Q What was said? 
A Well, he let me know that they were going to be storing his 
semen and at that point it was for when he recovered. And we also talked 
about if he happened to not recover what he would do and he talked about 
having Gayle have his child after he died. 
Q He wanted Gayle to have his child if he did not survive the 
treatment and cancer? 
A Yes, he did. 
(tr242). 
Thus, this extrinsic evidence at the administrative hearing by the Social Security's own 
Administrative Law Judge clearly indicates that Michael wished for there to be "a piece of him 
and I....on the earth. He wanted me to have his kids." And his sister also agreed, in that "he 
talked about having Gayle have his child after he died." 
The Burnses made a reasonable inference that Michael was donating or gifting his 
cryopreserved semen to his wife, "who will assume all of the...terms described in this contract." 
Again, these terms include "artificial insemination," "contribution to a future pregnancy," 
"offspring resulting from the artificial insemination," "trying to achieve pregnancy with 
15 
insemination," "and be able to result in pregnancy." Thus, by inference and extrinsic evidence 
and resolving doubts in the party's favor who did not draft the contract, Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. 
of N. America, 669 P.2d 410, 417 (Utah 1983), there is no other logical conclusion but that "the 
deceased spouse [Mr. Burns] consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur 
after his death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the child." U.C.A. 78B-15-707. 
The Appellee argues that Mr. Burns did not sign a specific document stating 
unequivocally that he would be the father of any child born after his death by means of artificial 
insemination with his own cryopreserved semen. But the statutes of Utah "are to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect the objects of the statute and to promote justice." U.C.A. 68-3-2. 
As a matter of equity and justice, Mr. Burns fulfilled the terms of the statute in question. 
This court and Appellants could reasonably infer and expect that the cryopreserved semen could 
be used for artificial insemination even after his death. To rule otherwise would contravene fair 
play, equity and justice. With this being a case of first impression in Utah, there were no real 
guidelines for the University of Utah or the Burnses to understand the ramifications of the terms 
of the contract and their signing such. 
Further, this case will have a very limited impact in Utah. This is only one case that 
presents itself with vague and questionable terms and it is unlikely that this will effect numerous 
cases in Utah and other states as alleged by the Appellee. Certainly the legal and the medical 
community will get wind of this decision and in the future revise their own semen storage 
agreements and incorporate terms similar to the statute in question. 
This court should reject the "plain language" argument of the Appellee as a matter of 
equity and justice. This court would not be defeating the legislative intent but rather interpreting 
16 
this specific contract as fitting into the framework of the statute in question and fulfilling the 
intent of the statute and the legislature. This court would not be writing new law but simply 
interpreting the present facts to help define this emerging area of medical technology. 
XI. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Therefore, based on the record and the arguments as above, the Appellants request that 
this court answer the question of law certified by the United States District Court in the 
affirmative, and conclude that this particular signed semen storage agreement to donate 
cryopreserved semen to the donor's wife in the event of his death is a "consent in a record" to 
being the parent of a child conceived by artificial means after the donor's death under Utah 
Intestacy Law, U.C.A. 78B-15-1707. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this * day of August, 2011. 
/ILLIAM R. HADLEj 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
17 
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SEmNSTOMGEAGMEMEm' 
• jke purpose of the document Is to act a* an agrees 
tgrmsttxx& in Bq^ nitrogen. J^Agreemmttbnma^ and entered into by 
and between the University of Utah School of M*tidne,Thvision of Urology, Salt Lake Cty, Utah, hereinafter 
sometimes referred to as "The University19 and jftMAft- S ^ - \ whose address is hereafter ghat and who is 
wmetimes referred teas the "Donor". 
v.V-:''. •.;."••.:••.•. • • . ; /•'. ' AGREEMENT/ •?''.•:/,• 
The Donor has consulted with"a doctor and U has been determined that the 
Donor may be an appropriate candidate to have his semen collected, evaluated, frozen and stored for hh 
future use or other possible uses as hereinafter set forth. Semen is desired by the donor for one or more of 
the following reasons: 
A* ,.;.' Prior to vasectomy; 
Prior to inadlation and/orchemotherapy;. 
Prior to exposure to potentially toxic medications; 
Prior to closure to potentially toxk 
Priortotravel or extended absense of the donor; 
Prior to artificial insemination; 
Prior to shipment of the.semen to another location; 
. Or other reasons deemed'appropriate by my Doctor. 
I hereby request that the University of tJtah store my semen by cryopreservation (storage in liquid 
nitrogen). 
I (donor) understand andagrte to tiie follow conditions; 
A* To have a current semen analysis of my semen by the University of Utah Androbgy laboratory to 
. determine if my semen quality is sufficient to consider preservation by freezing. A witten report ivill 
•• be sent to the.Donor or Donors Doctor evaluating the quality of the semen. [ understand that b is 
impossible to determine with absolute certainty if. my semen will freeze and thaw well enough to 
*. 
•&.' 
C 
D. 
E. 
F. 
a 
H. 
• contnbut^JajaJi^ejregnancyi If it is determined that sperm qualify is altered enough to make 
"~" ••—•——- - ....i^5fy . .1.. • • * • . • * . . • 
the technique of 'freezing and thamg imlH^Mre* the donor 
yvWbe tBscouragedfrom ayoprtsermg sperm If the donor still chooses Uy present the sperm then 
his desires will be followed by the University even though the Donor understands the technique of 
cryopraervatbnlsunlikefytoresutinviabkspa 
Spaih)Wbefrozintn sn**UFU***vud*. UMuaUy trials can be frozen from one semen sample. 
CYHIRffC^CAGpa^  
JtbtHgrrrttrf**"1*1*1*"** T3-y * «fek befrorenfar longterm starast, Tht donor understands that * 
the use of frozen-thawed sperm routs in a much lower chance of'pregnane? compared to fresh 
sperm. Hi* cvrrertty estimate** thMfi^ 
• compared to froxen^a^ 
addeve pregnancy w& 
i f b w W W ^ 
nion^h^ a 
jptegtuaw / l *« j fcraf«tf^^^ Attkeen^ofthc 
assuming aU of the obligations have bttn me} a* contained herein, anti^ 
totheprovisionsofthh agreement . . . 
The donor agrees to pay all costs assockted vrith semen analyses, fr 
of his semen. These charges wiU be billed in advance/or the foDawbig sfamonih period. In the 
event that the agreement is automatically renewed the Donor ajpeesto pay in advance the storage 
f^for each sompUheid Currently the fie for a semen analysis 
•h $70; the costforfreezing Ui70 and the c^ The cost for long 
' term storage a currently SI JSMrf 
E. The Donor understands that the University has the right to increase any of the above fees without 
prior notice to the Donor. 
F. Any charge for storage shattbe paid y ^ 
charges shall be deemed delinquent 
G. The Unhershy shaE release the vidl(s) of Donorrs frozen semen only upon written notice by the 
EtonJor and on^ to a Ucen^ 
andupon cornpBancewth reasonable procedures and policieswhich the University mayfrom time 
to time establish, including payment of a shipping and/or trantffrfa 
. This agreementshalltermmate, and tht University's responsibility for storage shall ceases upon the 
9<xurrenc*ofcwormoreofthefo1Lowwg# 
(a)
 % Release(of aUihe semen samples according to tfcf terms of this agreement and payment of 
th* applicable transfer fee; . . . 
Written direction by the Donor to the University authorizing destruction of all semen 
v »—n-*inrQBe; 
70 
B. 
ocatrrti 
M . 
tht 
:• j r . • 
S, S ^ S S S t S K S C U - - . 
"^SSsss^rrrr^ 
btfav):. . ' ,AJ.,' fialtr^ • JfllPiM**-
• Dtstreyd - - - * -
 fuitaldona&>n to J z * L — — -
• ifaltaabi^d hi storage forJ»^ 
.mO» ' 
u 
t-
a&rdJfanshtp) who wM assume aUofthe obligations and terms described in this contract 
'&& 
In the event cftermbtotion of the agreement foranyofthereasons above, the University will destroy 
. the viaifs) of semen held in storage. 
The Donor acknowledges that he understands that there is an Inherent risk in the process of 
• co&ctbtgjreezkg, storage and thawing of semen which may render it Ineffective for insemination 
and Donor agrees to assume this risk. 
bkjq7mdthatM#jze?^ofL^ 
reason wheSsoew, that anydamage which may result to the Donor or any thirdpa^ 
and impossible to determine. Accordingly, in the event of loss, damage or destruction during the 
process of collecting, freezing, storage, thawing, transferring or other procedures, the Donor will 
accept and the University wul pay as toptidat^ 
which kare been paid for the year bt which the lass, damage or desfructbn\occurs,puis the sum of 
SIMM* . . 
Donor covenants and agrees, without a reservation of rights, in law or equity, to indemnify!, Hold 
harmless and release the University and its employees and agents* includingbut without limitation^ 
the doctor, thou persons who collect, examine, evaluate, collect, store,.preserve, transfer or 
manipulate the semen samples from any and all liability ot-obligation ofany kind or manner, 
• mdudShg attorney's fees, connected with said procedures or related thereto, and any other adverse 
consequences qfanyJdndthat may arise to be connected directly or indirectly to, or in any manner. 
with, the offspring resulting from the artificial Insemination utilizing said semen samples and/or 
procedures connected therewith, except to the extentandunder the circumstances set forth in the 
next preceding paragraph 
Any notices provided hereunder shall be sent to the address as set forth below, and it shall be the 
responsibility of the Donor to provide his current address to the University, if different from that as 
stated below and eery notice, correspondence or billing directed to that address shall be presumed to 
have been received in the regular course of mail by the Donor. 
Either party may terminate this agreement upon thirty (30) days written notice to the other, any 
provisionito the contrary notwithstandbtgytnlhe event such a Urmbxation notice to the Donor is 
given by the Unbersty, any unused portion of the storage charges for the then current six month 
. period, shall be returned to Donor and the Donor shall have the responsibility, following payment 
ofapphcabU transfer fees, to arrange the transfer, use or disposition ofatevial(s)ofsemen then in 
the possession of the University. In the event the Donor terminates this agreement written notice . 
must be received and acknowledged by the University. 
The Donor acknowledges thai the University of Utah, the University School of Medicine, the Division 
#Wiiw,att
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Utah Government Immunity Act, Section 63-30-1, et seq., U.CA., 1953 as amended, which Act 
ccmtrok aUprocedure and limitotwnswi& 
This agreement shaR be binding upon the administrators, heirs and successors of the parties: 
This instrument and all issues arising incident thereto shall be controlled by and construed in 
72 
accordance M&h the laws of the State of Utah, andjurisdictum and venue shall be exclusively vested 
m the Third Ju&cial District Court in and for said State. 
Has ttfrttment represents the enth^agrte^^ understandings, 
ugimmmUs, or representations other than at set forth herein. Theprintedfportion ofthis contract 
h the amtractbieMxm the Donor and the fa Crotsorts, written adaulcns, rwtcs or otherwise 
do mot alter or become part of this contract Written date and signatures do become part of this 
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